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Social Science and the Courts 
The Role of Amicus Curiae Briefs* 
Ronald Roesch,t Stephen L. Golding,: 
Valerie P. Hans,? and N. Dickon Reppucci? 
Social scientists have increasingly become involved in the submission of amicus curiae or "friend of 
the court" briefs in legal cases being decided by state and federal courts. This increase has triggered 
considerable debate about the use of briefs to communicate relevant social science research. This 
article evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of various methods of summarizing social science 
research for the courts. It also reviews the procedures for submitting briefs developed by the American 
Psychology-Law Society which, in collaboration with the American Psychological Association, has 
submitted its first brief in Maryland v. Craig, a case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Social scientists have become increasingly involved in the submission of amicus 
curiae or "friend of the court" briefs to the courts (Acker, 1990; Tremper, 1987). 
Such briefs summarize research relevant to a particular legal case, describing 
implications for legal issues before a court. Social science briefs have been sub- 
mitted in a number of recent cases, including those on the death penalty (Lockhart 
v. McCree, 1986; Bersoff, 1987), gay rights (Watkins v. United States Army, 1988; 
Melton, 1989), abortion (Thornburgh v. American College of Physician and Sur- 
geons, 1986; Interdivisional Committee on Adolescent Abortion, 1987), jury size 
(Ballew v. Georgia, 1978; Tanke & Tanke, 1979), prediction of dangerousness 
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(Barefoot v. Estelle, 1983), and rights of mentally ill individuals (City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 1985; Melton & Garrison, 1987). 
This issue of Law and Human Behavior provides an opportunity to discuss 
and debate the participation of social scientists in amicus briefs. A year ago, the 
American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS) initiated a pro bono brief project in 
which it collaborates with the American Psychological Association (APA) in pre- 
paring briefs. The first such brief was filed in Maryland v. Craig (1990), a U.S. 
Supreme Court case involving courtroom testimony of child witnesses. Introduc- 
ing a new feature of Law and Human Behavior, we are pleased to publish this 
brief in its entirety, along with commentary on the Court's decision (Goodman, 
Levine, Melton, & Ogden, 1991). This issue of the journal also includes an Ad- 
versary Forum in which Rogers Elliott and Phoebe Ellsworth debate the role of 
social science briefs in the context of death penalty cases. 
The participation of social scientists in amicus briefs has raised numerous 
important and complex issues in the scholarly community. There has been a 
long-standing debate about the appropriate role for social scientists with respect 
to public policy (see Reppucci, 1985). Should social scientists limit themselves to 
conducting and publishing their research and leave it to others to apply their 
research findings? Or do they have an ethical obligation to assist the courts and 
other social groups in matters relating to their expertise? If an activist role for 
social scientists is appropriate, what are the comparative advantages of brief 
writing, expert testimony, and other mechanisms of approaching the courts? 
By publishing the Craig brief and the articles in this issue, we hope to facil- 
itate open scholarly discussion about the brief process. We invite comments from 
readers on any aspect of this process, from the general propriety of amicus briefs 
to specific conclusions and inferences drawn from any particular brief. The editor 
will review comments, but expects that, space permitting, all of them will be 
published so that a range of opinion and discussion is aired. We hope that pub- 
lication of these briefs and commentary encourages substantive debate about how 
the research findings of our field are best communicated to the courts. 
Social Science Impact on the Legal System 
Social science research might influence court decisions in a number of ways. 
At one end of the continuum, researchers take no active role in directly commu- 
nicating their research results to the judiciary-research findings are published, 
usually in scientific journals, and may find their way into legal decisions if judges 
cite them as secondary sources for their opinions. Ellsworth and Getman (1986) 
argue that the greatest impact of social science findings may occur when research 
findings are so widely disseminated and accepted in the community at large that 
judges consider them to be truisms. At the other end of the continuum, research 
is brought directly to the attention of the courts in formal briefs prepared for 
particular cases. Obviously, this requires more active and direct participation by 
individuals and organizations. 
Although it has been argued that there is a growing influence of social science 
in law (Levine & Howe, 1985), measuring the impact of social science research is 
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a particularly difficult problem. Impact studies rely primarily on citation counts 
for an indication of whether the courts have used such research in their opinions. 
Counts of social science articles cited in legal decisions may possibly underrep- 
resent the influence of research because judges may be reluctant to cite empirical 
research even when it influenced their opinions (Tremper, 1987). Further, as 
Hafemeister and Melton (1987) point out, "Citations may be mere makeweight or 
post hoc rationalizations for views originating from other, unexpressed sources" 
(p. 33). It may also be that judges cite or rely on a brief when the brief supports 
their position and ignore it when it does not. 
Given their legal training, judges are, of course, more inclined to cite legal 
precedent in their opinions. In a study of the Supreme Court's use of social 
science research in children's cases, Hafemeister and Melton (1987) found that 
judges most often cite prior legal opinions to substantiate an opinion, a conclusion 
also reached in similar citation studies (e.g., Tremper, 1987). When secondary 
social science sources were cited, they were typically ones published in legal 
periodicals or government reports. Hafemeister and Melton conclude that re- 
searchers who want their results to reach the courts should publish in law reviews, 
participate in government and organizational task forces, and contribute to state- 
of-the-art reviews and briefs by professional organizations. 
It may also be that judges do not rely on social science research because of 
the substantial differences in the disciplines of law and social science. Haney 
(1980) contrasts the two disciplines and points to differences in "styles and meth- 
ods of reasoning, proof, and justification used in psychology and law" (p. 158). 
Because judges are trained in the law and are generally unfamiliar with psychol- 
ogy's research methodology and statistics, they are naturally more inclined to rely 
on legal scholarship and precedent when they make their decisions. The differ- 
ences in training and approaches to scholarship make communication between the 
two disciplines difficult. However, the increase in the number of social scientists 
with degrees in both law and psychology (Roesch, Grisso, & Poythress, 1985; 
Tomkins & Ogloff, 1990), the introduction of social science courses in law schools 
(Monahan & Walker; see review by Slobogin, 1991), and the hiring of psycholo- 
gists in law schools (Melton, Monahan, & Saks, 1987) may lessen the gap. 
The Use of Expert Testimony 
Some argue that expert testimony in the court may be the best way to intro- 
duce social science evidence because it allows the court to determine the direct 
relevancy of the testimony, it allows experts to educate triers of fact with respect 
to complex scientific debates and literature, and it allows the court to evaluate the 
evidence subject to cross-examination (see Tremper, 1987, for a review). At the 
same time, the use of adversary experts to convey scientific findings presents a 
number of problems (e.g., Chesler, Sanders, & Kalmuss, 1988; Fienberg, 1989; 
McCloskey, Egeth, & McKenna, 1986; Saks, 1990; Vidmar & Schuller, 1989). 
Among other things, scholars question the ability of individual scientists to 
present accurate and unbiased summaries of the scientific literature under the 
pressures of an adversary system that encourages partisan presentations of re- 
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search literature (Saks, 1990). Critics also express doubts about the ability of 
judges (see Fienberg, 1989) and juries (see Vidmar & Schuller, 1989) to interpret 
and weigh scientific evidence presented by individual experts within an adversar- 
ial format. The advocacy role played by many expert witnesses may also have 
weakened the value of such testimony (and briefs as well) in the eyes of the court 
(see Bazelon, 1982). Undoubtedly, courtroom battles of the experts have reduced 
the credibility of psychological research in the eyes of many judges as well as the 
public. When experts disagree, the courts may decide that the best course is to 
simply ignore their testimony. These problems with expert testimony may be 
mitigated in several ways. First, the courts could use their authority to appoint a 
panel of experts. Second, the increasing prevalence of social science courses in 
law school curricula should have the effect of increasing social science sophisti- 
cation in the legal community. Finally, the dissemination of specialty guidelines 
such as those developed by AP-LS (Golding, Grisso, Shapiro, & Weissman, 1990) 
may increase the rigor of cross-examination and the quality of the testimony 
offered to the courts. 
The Use of Briefs 
Briefs can supplement or take the place of expert witnesses as a method for 
communicating a body of research findings to the courts. This is perhaps more 
true with appellate courts since trial courts make limited use of briefs, tradition- 
ally relying on expert testimony. Briefs may have an advantage over expert tes- 
timony because they are usually prepared by several individuals, they are re- 
viewed by official groups or organizations,1 and their sources are documented. 
Also, brief writers are not paid for their work, unlike experts who are hired by one 
side or the other to testify in court. Consequently, the courts may have more 
confidence that the brief represents the field as a whole. 
Briefs draw conclusions from a body of research studies with conditions that 
vary by time, place, experimenter, sample, experimental manipulation, and other 
variables. When these multiple experiments produce results consistent with a 
particular inference, convergent validity can be established, as Ellsworth (1991) 
points out in her article in this issue of Law and Human Behavior. Problems can 
arise when the results of multiple experimenters are divergent or when the infer- 
ences to be made are not clear-cut. In this case, the brief writers' task is more 
difficult, and the resulting brief may be more controversial.2 
As is the case in most scientific inquiries, the methodology used in a partic- 
ular study, the analysis of the data, and the conclusions and inferences drawn are 
Critics might argue that in reality there is little review because of time constraints, so it is not always 
possible to get broad input. 
2 Indeed, some scholars reject the possibility that social science research has much to offer. For 
example, Gergen (1982) takes a dim view of the amount of knowledge generated by social science. 
He argues that social science has no clear and dependable product, and research findings are often 
ambiguous and susceptible to alternative explanations. Gergen suggests that social psychological 
research is primarily a historical inquiry, documenting fluctuating, nonrepeating social facts, thus 
preventing an accumulation of knowledge about principles of human behavior or interaction. 
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often subject to the criticism of other researchers. In short, there is often dispute 
about the validity of a particular study or even a series of studies. In Frye v. 
United States (1923), a widely recognized standard for the admissibility of expert 
testimony in court, the court held that the "scientific principle or discovery ... 
must be sufficiently established to have gained scientific acceptance in the par- 
ticular field in which it belongs" (p. 1014). Recent changes in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (1984, Rule 702), which applies to federal courts and some state courts, 
creates a standard that is broader than Frye, allowing evidence from individuals 
with specialized knowledge who can assist the trier of fact. This may eliminate 
some of the problems that result from the Frye standard, because, as demon- 
strated by the debate contained in the Adversary Forum in this issue, scientific 
acceptance of a particular conclusion drawn from a body of research can be 
difficult to determine. Courts frequently rely on the statements of a small number 
of expert witnesses to assess consensus, often resulting in a situation in which two 
experts reach different conclusions about whether a particular finding is well 
established. Rarely are surveys of experts available such as the one conducted by 
Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith (1989) on eyewitness research, but they can be 
useful to the courts in determining the degree of consensus among researchers 
about specific findings and conclusions drawn from a body of research. Kassin et 
al. are careful to note, however, that even with this information there are prob- 
lems with using consensus as the sole criterion of admissibility. Nevertheless, 
surveys of experts can provide important data that could be included in briefs and 
other court communications. 
Of course, criticism and debate are at the heart of the scientific enterprise. 
However, whereas social scientists see this as essential, the courts may interpret 
it as an indication of the weakness of the research evidence. Consequently, judges 
may be reluctant to base decisions, even in part, on social science research. 
Judges may also decide against using research because, as Faigman (1989) points 
out, "the concern arises that explicit reliance on social science research might 
lead to the undercutting of some legal rules if subsequent studies contradict the 
earlier studies first used to establish the rule" (p. 1042). Faigman maintains there 
are at least two reasons why this should not be a deterrent to the use of social 
science research by the courts. First, such research is never the sole foundation 
of a legal decision. Second, the fact that results may fluctuate over time does not 
invalidate prior research. Rather, it may simply reflect real changes in individuals, 
groups, or societal conditions. Indeed, some changes may be the direct result of 
legal decisions that have affected the lives of individuals and consequently 
changed their attitudes or behavior. 
Monahan and Walker (1988; see also Walker & Monahan, 1988) offer a cre- 
ative proposal that could effectively address concerns about the limits of social 
science research. They propose that research should be treated as legal precedent 
in much the same way that case law is regarded, subject to the normal reviews of 
evidence law. Under their proposal, social scientists would have a limited role as 
expert witnesses. Rather, they would "collaborate with attorneys on the produc- 
tion of written briefs that would be the primary vehicle by which the parties 
present empirical research" (p. 471). 
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The Advocacy versus Science Translation Role for Briefs 
Briefs may also be analyzed along a continuum. At one end is a science 
translation brief, which is intended to be an objective summary of a body of 
research. At the other end is an advocacy brief, which takes a position on some 
legal or public policy issue. Whereas some briefs may attempt to be neutral in 
their portrayal of a body of literature, many are more adversarial in nature. In- 
deed, some have argued that adversarial briefs represent the predominant method 
(see Tremper, 1987, for a review), a perception that may lead judges to regard 
briefs as suspect. AP-LS has decided to follow the science translation model as 
closely as possible. However, we would argue that all briefs must evaluate and 
interpret research, so the distinction between science translation and advocacy 
briefs may often be blurred. Although it is a laudable goal to strive to represent 
objectively a body of research, even a science translation brief will reflect the 
knowledge, perspectives, and values of the brief writers. 
Melton and Saks (1990) discuss the difficulties in deciding how much inter- 
pretation versus summary a brief should contain: 
Either alternative can end up misleading a reader, especially a law reader, which is what 
the judges are when they read these kinds of briefs. The solution, we think, is in ap- 
proaching the writing with an honest desire to share with the courts a faithful picture of 
the available psychological knowledge, and to interpret the research only to the extent 
that doing so will clarify its meaning. (p. 5) 
To the extent, of course, that briefs depart from a straight summary of the 
research and offer more evaluative and interpretive commentary, they may be the 
target of criticism from social scientists with differing views of what conclusions 
can be drawn from the research. We believe that this controversy is inevitable 
because there will invariably be some disagreement among social scientists about 
the conclusions to be drawn from a body of research. In preparing briefs, social 
scientists should strive to ensure, at a minimum, that briefs represent a consensual 
view of social scientists (i.e., what most experts in the field would conclude). 
When appropriate, the briefs should make explicit alternative interpretations and 
opposing perspectives. This would be in keeping with Bazelon's (1982) urgent call 
for disclosure by social scientists. 
Death Penalty as a Case in Point 
The use of amicus briefs, with specific reference to the recent involvement of 
APA in death penalty cases, is the topic debated in the Adversary Forum in this 
issue. In Lockhart v. McCree (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the validity 
and legal relevance of the social science data presented by expert evidence and in 
an APA brief (see Bersoff, 1987; Elliott, 1990; Ellsworth, 1988). Both Ellsworth 
(1988) and Thompson (1989) argue that the McCree decision is poorly reasoned 
and unconvincing in its analysis of the social science evidence and of the legal 
issue of jury impartiality, and they posit that the Justices did not understand how 
to use social science research. Thompson (1989) comments that the Justices may 
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have assumed that a study is unworthy of consideration unless its design rules out 
all possible confounds and alternative explanations-an assumption he refers to as 
"the myth of the definitive study." This incorrect assumption derives from a 
failure to appreciate the concept of convergent validity as it applies to an accu- 
mulation of studies (Ellsworth, 1991) and also to understand the reality that most 
changes in procedure (e.g., in medical practice) are based on much less definitive 
results than those normally reported in highly regarded professional research 
journals (Rosenthal, 1990). 
Thompson goes on to argue that the Court's decision may have rested on 
pragmatic rather than legal foundations. Legal realists maintain that this is often 
the case. In McCree, the Court may have approached the issue of death qualifi- 
cation pragmatically, balancing the perceived costs of eliminating death qualifi- 
cation against the increased protection of defendants' rights that would have been 
afforded by the remedy sought in McCree. More cynically, as Thompson sug- 
gests, the decision may have been influenced by a desire to avoid reversing over 
1,500 convictions of defendants tried by death-qualified juries. 
It is clear that other factors may influence a court decision and that briefs are 
simply one potential contribution to the case at hand. There will be times when 
social scientists will be frustrated that they did not have greater influence, as in 
the McCree case, and there will be other times when their influence will be more 
substantial, as in the Craig case. Diamond (1989), for example, encourages psy- 
chologists to focus on the "trouble cases," cases where legal doctrine does not 
provide the court with clear guidance. She maintains that the courts are likely to 
be more receptive to social science research in these cases than in other cases 
where legal doctrines are settled. 
Of course, the fact that social scientists can be jubilant or disappointed over 
the outcome of a case in which a brief has been filed implies that brief writers do 
have a position and desire a particular outcome. We do not quarrel with this, but 
simply believe that it supports our earlier point that a truly neutral brief is an 
elusive if not an impossible goal. In some sense, the distinction between a science 
translation brief and an advocacy brief is arbitrary, and it is often not readily 
apparent where on the continuum a particular brief belongs. It is possible to be 
scientific without being neutral, to be objective yet form an opinion about the 
implications of the research. If the data warrant a particular conclusion, then it 
may be reasonable for brief writers to advocate for a legal decision that would 
reflect the knowledge gained from the research. 
Pro Bono Amicus Brief Project 
As noted earlier in this article, AP-LS has initiated a project in which it will 
participate in writing amicus briefs in collaboration with APA. The AP-LS Exec- 
utive Committee appointed the Pro Bono Amicus Committee,3 whose primary 
3 The current members of the committee are Gary Melton and Michael Saks, co-chairs, Peter Blanck, 
Patricia Falk, Clark Stanton, and Richard Wiener. 
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responsibility is to identify topics for which briefs might be appropriate.4 Brief 
topics can come to the attention of the committee from a variety of sources, 
including U.S. Law Week reports on cases that have been granted certiorari, 
newspaper stories, calls from division members or state associations, or calls from 
APA or one of its directorates. Once a potential case is identified, the committee 
consults with APA's Executive Office and the Public Interest Directorate. The 
purpose of these consultations is to (a) obtain an initial measure of APA's interest 
in the case, (b) start APA's review process through the Committee on Legal 
Issues (CoLI), and (c) obtain suggestions from APA divisions regarding individ- 
uals with expertise who could become the principal brief writers. The decision to 
write a brief requires the consent of a number of individuals and committees. 
These include the Pro Bono Amicus Committee, the president of AP-LS and the 
division's executive committee, and several groups and individuals within the 
APA structure, including CoLI, the Board of Directors, and its in-house and 
outside legal counsel. Finally, the committee must find individuals who are willing 
to write the brief, usually within a tight time frame. As a practical matter, if any 
of the above disapproves of a brief, it will not be written. 
When all parties agree to prepare a brief, the task of writing it falls to the 
substantive experts selected by the committee, along with one or two members of 
the committee who participate in writing the brief. The committee wants the briefs 
to be written in science translation style, providing a summary of empirical re- 
search or psychological theory that addresses an issue salient to a case to be heard 
in state or federal appellate courts. The committee views briefs as a method of 
providing knowledge and information to the courts. 
One innovation established by the committee is what it refers to as plain label 
briefs. The main difficulty in preparing briefs for cases that are already being 
considered by a court is that time pressures limit the amount of consultation and 
feedback before a brief is submitted. Typically, the writers only have a few weeks 
to prepare the brief. One way of avoiding the problems created by this time 
pressure is to draft some briefs before actual cases are being considered by the 
court. Topics would be selected that are likely to come before one court or 
another in the near future. Such briefs can be developed and reviewed by more 
people than is feasible when a brief must be filed quickly. When an actual case 
arises, the plain label brief would be updated and edited to fit the particular case. 
When possible, Law and Human Behavior will publish plain label briefs, allowing 
readers of the journal to have input into subsequent drafts of a brief before it is 
actually filed in a particular case. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
We began this article with a comment that the number of social science briefs 
has been steadily increasing. Nevertheless, the percentage of cases in which such 
4 The material for this section was drawn from a report prepared by Gary Melton and Michael Saks 
(1990), and from personal communications from the committee co-chairs. 
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briefs are filed is quite low. The vast majority of state and federal court decisions 
do not benefit from briefs even in cases in which social science research might be 
highly relevant. AP-LS has initiated a brief submission process in an effort to 
stimulate more communication with the courts. The involvement of AP-LS and 
APA in amicus briefs has been debated by many scholars. Elliott (1991) raises two 
fundamental questions about the practice of brief submission by APA. First, are 
the data sufficiently valid to warrant their communication to the court?, and 
second, can briefs communicate the research results adequately? Ellsworth (1991) 
points out that the first issue must be addressed in the context of a specific case 
and the answer will vary from case to case. Clearly, we need to be able to 
recognize when the empirical evidence is weak or inconclusive so that we do not 
submit briefs that overstate scientific authority, as Gardner, Scherer, and Tester 
(1989) caution. The second issue relates to a more general question about the 
value of briefs as a method of summarizing and communicating social science 
research. It is important to keep these two issues separate in order to assess the 
role of briefs generally as well as the adequacy of a specific brief. We are pub- 
lishing the Craig brief as an example of a specific case involvement and we invite 
readers to review it in the context of the questions and issues raised by several 
authors in this issue of Law and Human Behavior. We also invite comments on 
more general issues concerning the process of communicating social science re- 
search to the judiciary. 
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